USA v. David Donovan by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-31-2011 
USA v. David Donovan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. David Donovan" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 284. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/284 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 10-4295 
_____________ 
                         
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DAVID H. DONOVAN, 
Appellant                          
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-96-cv-00484) 
District Judge: Honorable Leonard P. Stark 
_____________                         
 
Argued on July 12, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  October 31, 2011)                         
 
_____________ 
 
 
 
2 
 
Richard A. Barkasy, Esq. 
Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis 
120 Fifth Avenue 
2700 Fifth Avenue Place 
Pittsburgh, PA  15222 
 
Marieke T. Beck-Coon, Esq. 
Stephen A. Fogdall, Esq.     [ARGUED] 
Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis 
1600 Market Street, Suite 3600 
Philadelphia, PA  19103 
    Counsel for Appellant 
 
Katherine J. Barton, Esq.     [ARGUED] 
United States Department of Justice 
Environment & Natural Resources Division 
P.O. Box 23795 
L’Enfant Plaza Station 
Washington, DC 20026 
 
Patricia C. Hannigan, Esq. 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
Office of United States Attorney 
1007 North Orange Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 2046 
Wilmington, DE  19899 
 
Kent E. Hanson, Esq. 
United States Department of Justice 
Environmental Defense Section  
P.O. Box 23986 
Washington, DC  20026 
    Counsel for Appellee 
3 
 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
 David H. Donovan added fill material to a portion of 
his property in New Castle County, Delaware that the United 
States contends is “wetlands” subject to the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA” or “Act”).  The Government brought an enforcement 
proceeding against him under the Act to force him to remove 
the fill and pay a fine.  Donovan argued that his property is 
not covered by the CWA.  However, the District Court 
disagreed, granting summary judgment in the Government’s 
favor and imposing a $250,000 fine.  In this appeal, we are 
called upon to decide what test to apply in order to determine 
whether land is “wetlands” subject to the CWA after the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 
715 (2006).  We join the Courts of Appeals for the First and 
Eighth Circuits in holding, as the District Court here did, that 
property is “wetlands” subject to the CWA if it meets either 
of the tests laid out in Rapanos.  We hold, further, that 
summary judgment was properly granted and will affirm. 
 
I. Background 
 
A.  Facts and Procedural Posture 
 
Donovan has owned a four-acre parcel of land 
bordering Route 13 near Smyrna in New Castle County, 
Delaware since September 29, 1982.  The land is situated 
within the watershed of the Sawmill Branch, which flows into 
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the Smyrna River, and then into the Delaware Estuary and on 
to the Delaware Bay.  The Sawmill Branch becomes tidal 
approximately 2.5 miles from Donovan’s property.  In August 
1987, the land was inspected by the United States Army 
Corps of Engineers (“Corps”).  Following this inspection, the 
Corps categorized the property as wetlands, concluded that 
approximately ¾ of an acre had been recently filled by 
Donovan, and warned Donovan that federal law required him 
to obtain a permit should he wish to fill more than one acre of 
his property.   
 
In early 1993, the Corps again inspected Donovan’s 
land and found that he had continued to fill his property 
without a permit.  In July 1993, the Corps sent a cease-and-
desist notice to Donovan, ordering him to remove 0.771 acres 
of fill material, or to submit a pre-discharge notification.  
Donovan rebuffed this initial notice and the similar notices 
that followed.  Donovan’s emphatic response to the notices 
was that the Corps had no right to regulate the use of his land.   
 
In 1996, the United States sued Donovan, alleging that 
he had violated the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).  In March 
2002, the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware concluded that Donovan had violated the CWA.  
Donovan appealed, but we dismissed the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction because the District Court’s order was not then 
final.  On December 21, 2006, the District Court entered a 
final judgment against Donovan, imposing a $250,000 fine 
and requiring him to remove 0.771 acres of fill from his land. 
 
Donovan appealed the December 21, 2006 judgment, 
arguing that the CWA did not give the Corps jurisdiction over 
his land.  On July 24, 2008, we appointed amicus to address 
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whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos v. United 
States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), would require remand in this 
case.1
 
  The Government then filed a motion requesting that 
the case be remanded to the District Court so that a record 
could be developed on the issue of the Corps’ jurisdiction 
over Donovan’s land.  We granted that motion and remanded 
the case to the District Court on April 13, 2009.   
On remand, the District Court referred the case to a 
Magistrate Judge for all pretrial matters.  On March 15, 2010, 
Donovan moved for judgment on the pleadings and the 
Government moved for summary judgment.  The 
Government submitted two expert reports: one from wetland 
scientist Edward M. Launay (“Launay report”) and the other 
from scientists at the Stroud Water Research Center (“Stroud 
report”).  Both reports were based on extensive analysis and 
testing of Donovan’s property between June 2009 and 
November 2009.  Launay used a variety of methods to map 
stream channels on and around Donovan’s property and to 
demonstrate that they were perennial.  The Stroud scientists 
examined the physical, chemical, and biological connections 
between the wetlands on Donovan’s property and 
downstream waters of the Sawmill Branch.  The Stroud 
scientists analyzed, inter alia, the wetlands’ hydrological 
connections to downstream waters, the wetlands’ potential for 
filtering pollutants, and the wetlands’ role in the aquatic 
ecosystem for fish and invertebrates.   
                                              
1 In Rapanos, the Supreme Court, in a 4-1-4 opinion that we 
discuss more fully below, described two new tests for 
determining whether property is “wetlands” covered by the 
CWA.  The issue as to which test controls is a matter of first 
impression in this Court, and one we take up in depth below. 
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Donovan did not present any expert evidence in 
support of his motion, relying instead on his own affidavit, in 
which he expressed familiarity with the pattern of water flow 
on his property and stated that “the amount of water flowing 
on my Property in a given period is completely dependent on 
the amount of rainfall in the area during that period” and 
“[t]he only source of water flow on my Property is rainwater 
run-off from the adjacent highway.”  JA 639.  His affidavit 
claimed that “in periods of no rain” the channels on his 
property are “completely dry.”  JA 640.  Donovan also 
claimed that “2009 and 2010 are the rainiest and wettest years 
that I can recall in the nearly 50 years I have lived in the 
Smyrna region” and that the channels on his property were 
“completely dry for significant periods” in 2008, including 
“the summer months.”  Id.  Donovan also stated that “[i]n 
periods of heavy rainfall, when there is water flowing on my 
Property, the rainwater channels are clearly defined and easy 
to differentiate from the neighboring land.”  JA 641. 
 
The Magistrate Judge recognized that the sole issue to 
be decided was whether the property on which Donovan 
placed fill material is subject to regulation under the CWA.  
The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation 
(“R&R”) on July 23, 2010, which recommended that the 
District Court deny Donovan’s motion and grant summary 
judgment in favor of the Government.  In the R&R, the 
Magistrate Judge concluded that wetlands are covered by the 
CWA if they meet either of the tests articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Rapanos.  The Magistrate Judge then 
analyzed the Government’s expert reports and noted that they 
“offered sufficient evidence to support a finding” that the first 
Rapanos test was met, JA 17, and that they “adequately 
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show[ed]” that the second Rapanos test was met, JA 22.  The 
Magistrate Judge did not cite or credit Donovan’s declaration.  
The Magistrate Judge also recommended that Donovan’s 
motion for judgment on the pleadings be denied, stating that 
the Government had adequately pled a basis for asserting 
jurisdiction over Donovan’s land. 
 
Donovan objected wholesale to the R&R.  On 
September 13, 2010, the District Court overruled Donovan’s 
objections to the R&R, granted the Government’s motion for 
summary judgment, and denied Donovan’s motion for 
judgment on the pleadings.  The District Court rejected 
Donovan’s contention that the Magistrate Judge misapplied 
the legal standard for summary judgment, saying that “there 
is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the wetlands 
are subject to CWA jurisdiction, and . . . [Donovan] failed to 
come forward with evidence to enable a jury to reasonably 
find for . . . him on that issue.”  JA 30.  The District Court 
agreed with the Magistrate Judge that federal authority can be 
asserted over wetlands that meet either Rapanos test.  As to 
the first Rapanos test (which we will call the “continuous 
surface connection test” or the “plurality’s test”), the District 
Court concluded that the Government “propounded 
significant evidence” that the test was met, and that 
Donovan’s declaration failed to create a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the test was satisfied.  JA 33.  The 
District Court was also “satisfied that the Government’s 
evidence . . . establishes” that the second Rapanos test (which 
we will call the “significant nexus test” or “Justice Kennedy’s 
test”) was met and noted that Donovan had “largely relie[d] 
on arguments by counsel concerning alleged deficiencies with 
the Government’s evidence, but put[] forth no evidence of his 
own.”  JA 35-36.  The District Court concluded that Donovan 
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failed to come forward with specific facts showing a genuine 
issue for trial and granted the Government’s motion for 
summary judgment.  Finally, the District Court denied 
Donovan’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding 
that the Government pled enough factual matter to plausibly 
suggest that Donovan’s property is subject to the CWA. 
 
On November 8, 2010, Donovan appealed, arguing 
that the District Court applied the wrong legal standard to 
determine whether the Corps had jurisdiction over Donovan’s 
property and misapplied the summary judgment standard.   
 
B.  Legal Background 
 
 The CWA provides that “the discharge of any 
pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.”  33 U.S.C. § 
1311(a).  According to the statutory definition, “discharge of 
any pollutant” includes “any addition of any pollutant to 
navigable waters from any point source.”  33 U.S.C. § 
1362(12).2
                                              
2 The statute defines “pollutant” as “dredged spoil, solid 
waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, 
munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive 
materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, 
cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste 
discharged into water.”  33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).  Donovan does 
not argue that the filler material he used on his land does not 
qualify as a pollutant under the CWA. 
  The CWA defines “navigable waters” as the 
“waters of the United States.”  33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).  The 
Corps has interpreted this to mean that its regulatory 
jurisdiction extends over, inter alia, traditional navigable 
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waters, their tributaries, and wetlands which are adjacent to 
any of the above.  33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a).3
 
   
The Supreme Court first considered the CWA’s 
applicability to wetlands in United States v. Riverside 
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).  In that case, the 
Corps sought to enjoin a landowner from filling its property 
because the Corps deemed the property to be wetlands falling 
under the protection of the CWA.  The Supreme Court held 
that the Corps’ construction of the CWA as applying to 
wetlands adjacent to waterways covered by the Act4
 
 was 
reasonable and that the landowner could not fill its property 
without a permit from the Corps.  Id. at 131-35.       
                                              
3 The Corps’ regulations define wetlands as “those areas that 
are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a 
frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under 
normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation 
typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.  
Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and 
similar areas.”  33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b).  The term “adjacent” is 
defined in the regulations as meaning “bordering, contiguous, 
or neighboring.”  33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c).  According to the 
regulations, “adjacent wetlands” include “[w]etlands 
separated from other waters of the United States by man-
made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and 
the like.”  Id. 
 
4 The wetlands in Riverside Bayview were adjacent to a 
navigable-in-fact waterway.  Such waterways are inarguably 
covered by the CWA.  See 474 U.S. at 130-31. 
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The Supreme Court next addressed the scope of the 
CWA’s coverage in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook 
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 
(2001) (“SWANCC”).  In SWANCC, the Corps asserted 
jurisdiction over “an abandoned sand and gravel pit in 
northern Illinois” based on 51 Fed. Reg. 41217, a regulation 
that purported to extend the Corps’ jurisdiction to intrastate 
waters “which are or would be used as a habitat by” 
endangered species or birds that migrate across state lines.  
See id. at 162-64.  The Court held that the term “navigable 
waters,” as defined in the CWA, could not be interpreted to 
include “nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters” not 
adjacent to bodies of open water, such as the pit at issue.  Id. 
at 171.         
 
 The Supreme Court’s most recent exposition on the 
breadth of the Corps’ jurisdiction under the CWA came in 
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).  In Rapanos, 
a consolidation of two cases, the Court considered “whether 
four Michigan wetlands, which lie near ditches or man-made 
drains that eventually empty into traditional navigable waters, 
constitute ‘waters of the United States’ within the meaning of 
the Act.”  Id. at 729 (plurality opinion).   The Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had upheld the Corps’ claim of 
jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court, in a fractured 4-1-4 
decision, vacated those judgments and remanded for further 
proceedings to determine whether the wetlands were subject 
to the restrictions of the CWA.   
 
 Four dissenting Justices took an expansive view of the 
CWA’s reach.  Justice Stevens, writing for the dissenting 
Justices, stated that the Court should have deferred to what he 
and his fellow dissenting Justices viewed as the Corps’ 
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reasonable interpretation of its jurisdiction.  Id. at 796 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  However, five Justices believed that 
the Corps’ jurisdiction is more limited, although they did not 
all agree on the proper test to determine the scope of that 
jurisdiction. 
 
Justice Scalia, writing for a four-Justice plurality, 
stated that the term “waters of the United States” as used in 
the CWA “includes only those relatively permanent, standing 
or continuously flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic 
features’ that are described in ordinary parlance as ‘streams[,] 
. . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.’”  Id. at 739 (alterations in 
original) (citing Webster’s New International Dictionary 2882 
(2d ed. 1954)).  The plurality opinion noted that “the phrase 
[‘the waters of the United States’] does not include channels 
through which water flows intermittently or ephemerally, or 
channels that periodically provide drainage for rainfall.”  Id.  
As for wetlands, the Justices in the plurality concluded that 
they only fall within the scope of the CWA if they have “a 
continuous surface connection to bodies that are ‘waters of 
the United States’ in their own right, so that there is no clear 
demarcation between ‘waters’ and wetlands.”  Id. at 742. 
 
Justice Kennedy concurred.  Although agreeing with 
the plurality’s conclusion that the Corps’ jurisdiction was 
more limited than the dissenters believed and that the case 
should be remanded, Justice Kennedy disagreed with the 
plurality’s jurisdictional test.  Under Justice Kennedy’s 
approach, wetlands are subject to the strictures of the CWA if 
they possess a “significant nexus” with “waters of the United 
States,” meaning that the wetlands, “either alone or in 
combination with similarly situated lands in the region, 
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological 
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integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as 
‘navigable.’”  Id. at 779, 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
 
At first glance, the Rapanos opinions seem to present 
an analytical problem: the three opinions articulate three 
different views as to how courts should determine whether 
wetlands are subject to the CWA, and no opinion was joined 
by a majority of the Justices.  So which test should apply?  
Interestingly, after explaining why he would have affirmed 
the judgments below, Justice Stevens noted that, “[i]t has 
been [the Supreme Court’s] practice in a case coming to us 
from a lower federal court to enter a judgment commanding 
that court to conduct any further proceedings pursuant to a 
specific mandate.”  Id. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  That 
practice, he observed “has, on occasion, made it necessary for 
Justices to join a judgment that did not conform to their own 
views.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Then, Justice Stevens stated 
that, although the Justices voting to remand disagreed about 
the appropriate test to be applied, the four dissenting 
Justices—with their broader view of the CWA’s scope—
would nonetheless support a finding of jurisdiction under 
either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test, and that 
therefore the Corps’ jurisdiction should be upheld in all cases 
in which either test is satisfied.  Id. at 810 & n.14.  
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II. Discussion5
 
 
A.  The Standard(s) for Establishing Federal Regulatory 
Jurisdiction Over Wetlands 
 
Following Justice Stevens’s instruction, the District 
Court in the instant case examined both the Rapanos 
plurality’s test and Justice Kennedy’s test to determine 
whether the Corps has jurisdiction over Donovan’s land and 
concluded that both tests were met, resulting in a finding of 
jurisdiction.  Donovan argues that this was error because the 
opinions in Rapanos fail to provide any governing standard, 
and therefore, under this Court’s opinion in Rappa v. New 
Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043 (3d Cir. 1994), pre-Rapanos 
case law should govern whether Donovan’s land is subject to 
the CWA.  We disagree. 
 
While the Courts of Appeals are split on the proper 
interpretation of Rapanos, none has adopted Donovan’s 
position.  The Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Eleventh 
Circuits have concluded that Justice Kennedy’s test alone 
creates the applicable standard for CWA jurisdiction over 
                                              
5 The District Court had jurisdiction to consider this Clean 
Water Act enforcement case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 
1345, and 1355.  We have jurisdiction to review the District 
Court’s conclusions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment.  Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 
F.3d 765, 770 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review de novo a district 
court’s denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  
DiCarlo v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
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wetlands.  United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 
723, 724-25 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Robison, 505 
F.3d 1208, 1221-22 (11th Cir. 2007).  These courts based 
their conclusions on an analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Marks, in which the Court 
directed that, “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and 
no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds.”  430 U.S. 188, 193 
(1977) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
their view, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Rapanos controls 
because, among those Justices concurring in the judgment, 
Justice Kennedy’s view is the least restrictive of federal 
jurisdiction.  Gerke, 464 F.3d at 724-25; Robison, 505 F.3d at 
1221-22. 
 
The Courts of Appeals for the First and Eighth Circuits 
have taken a different view.  These courts examined the 
Supreme Court’s directive in Marks, but found that the 
Rapanos opinions did not lend themselves to a Marks analysis 
because neither the plurality opinion nor Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion relied on “narrower” grounds than the other.  United 
States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 62-64 (1st Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009).  Judge 
Lipez, writing for the majority of the panel in Johnson, 
disagreed that the “narrowest grounds” in the Marks sense 
necessarily means those grounds least restrictive of federal 
jurisdiction.  The court in Johnson stated that “it seems just as 
plausible to conclude that the narrowest ground of decision in 
Rapanos is the ground most restrictive of government 
authority . . . because that ground avoids the constitutional 
issue of how far Congress can go in asserting jurisdiction 
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under the Commerce Clause.”  467 F.3d at 63 (emphasis 
added).  Even if one were to conclude that the opinion resting 
on the narrowest grounds is the one that relies on “less 
sweeping reasons than the other”—meaning that it requires 
the same outcome (here, the presence of federal regulatory 
jurisdiction) in only a subset of the cases that the other 
opinion would, and in no other cases—the court in Johnson 
concluded that Marks is unhelpful in determining which 
Rapanos test controls.  Id. at 64.  This is because Justice 
Kennedy’s test would find federal jurisdiction in some cases 
that did not satisfy the plurality’s test, and vice versa.  Id.  For 
example, if there is a small surface water connection between 
a wetland and a remote navigable water, the plurality would 
find jurisdiction, while Justice Kennedy might not.  
Furthermore, a wetland that lacks a surface connection with 
other waters, but significantly affects the chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of a nearby river would meet Justice 
Kennedy’s test but not the plurality’s.  See id.  It is therefore 
difficult, if not impossible, to identify the “narrowest” 
approach. 
 
Accordingly, the Johnson Court looked to Justice 
Stevens’s approach in Rapanos and found it to provide “a 
simple and pragmatic way to assess what grounds would 
command a majority of the Court.”  Id.  According to the 
Johnson Court, following Justice Stevens’s instructions and 
looking to see if either Rapanos test is satisfied “ensures that 
lower courts will find jurisdiction in all cases where a 
majority of the Court would support such a finding.”  Id.6
                                              
6 The Johnson Court also suggested that the Supreme Court 
has moved away from the Marks formulation, citing several 
instances in which “members of the Court have indicated that 
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Therefore, the Courts of Appeals for the First and Eighth 
Circuits held that federal regulatory jurisdiction can be 
established over wetlands that meet either the plurality’s or 
Justice Kennedy’s test from Rapanos.  Id. at 66; Bailey, 571 
F.3d at 799.7
 
   
We agree with the conclusion of the First Circuit Court 
of Appeals that neither the plurality’s test nor Justice 
Kennedy’s can be viewed as relying on narrower grounds 
than the other, and that, therefore, a strict application of 
                                                                                                     
whenever a decision is fragmented such that no single opinion 
has the support of five Justices, lower courts should examine 
the plurality, concurring and dissenting opinions to extract the 
principles that a majority has embraced.”  467 F.3d at 65-66 
(citing cases).  Moreover, the Johnson Court stated that “the 
fact that Justice Stevens does not even refer to Marks 
indicates that he found its framework inapplicable.”  Id. at 66.  
 
7 Several Circuit Courts of Appeals have expressly reserved 
the issue of which Rapanos test, or tests, governs CWA 
enforcement actions.  See Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 278, 288 (4th Cir. 2011) (reserving 
judgment on whether Corps jurisdiction can be established 
under either Rapanos test); N. Cal. River Watch v. Wilcox, 
633 F.3d 766, 781 (9th Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. 
Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 210 (6th Cir. 2009) (declining to 
decide which Rapanos test or tests govern because 
jurisdiction was proper under both); United States v. Lucas, 
516 F.3d 316, 325-27 (5th Cir. 2008) (upholding Corps 
jurisdiction over wetlands where evidence at trial supported 
jurisdiction under the reasoning of the plurality, Justice 
Kennedy, and Justice Stevens). 
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Marks is not a workable framework for determining the 
governing standard established by Rapanos.  We also agree 
with its conclusion that each of the plurality’s test and Justice 
Kennedy’s test should be used to determine the Corps’ 
jurisdiction under the CWA.   
 
As we have stated in discussing Marks, our goal in 
analyzing a fractured Supreme Court decision is to find “a 
single legal standard . . . [that] when properly applied, 
produce[s] results with which a majority of the Justices in the 
case articulating the standard would agree.”  Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 
(3d Cir. 1991), modified on other grounds, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992).  To that end, we have looked to the votes of 
dissenting Justices if they, combined with votes from plurality 
or concurring opinions, establish a majority view on the 
relevant issue.  See United States v. Richardson, No. 11-1202, 
--- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 4430808, at *5 (3d Cir. Sept. 23, 2011) 
(viewing as “persuasive authority” the shared view of a four-
Justice dissent and a single-Justice concurrence); Horn v. 
Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 176 & n.18 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“Thus, on the state requirement issue, Justice Breyer joined 
with the four-member dissent to make a majority.”); Student 
Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. AT&T Bell Labs., 
842 F.2d 1436, 1451 (3d Cir. 1988) (deriving holding from 
one Justice concurrence and four dissenting Justices).     
 
The Supreme Court has also employed this mode of 
analysis.  In United States v. Jacobsen,  466 U.S. 109, 111 
(1984), the Supreme Court determined that the rule of law 
established by its prior decision in Walter v. United States, 
447 U.S. 649 (1980), could be divined by combining the 
opinion of the Walter Court (which garnered only two votes) 
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with the opinion of four dissenting Justices.  Justice Stevens, 
writing for a majority of the Justices in Jacobsen, 
downplayed its reliance on the votes of the dissenting Justices 
in extrapolating a legal standard from Walter, saying that “the 
disagreement between the majority and the dissenters in 
[Walter] with respect to the [application of law to fact] is less 
significant than the agreement on the standard to be applied.”  
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117 n.12; see also Vasquez v. Hillery, 
474 U.S. 254, 261 n.4 (1986) (describing as “unprecedented” 
the argument that “a statement of legal opinion joined by five 
Justices”—including some Justices in dissent—“does not 
carry the force of law”), Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 
293 & nn. 8-9 (1985) (deriving holdings from opinion of the 
Court, concurring opinions, and dissenting opinions); Moses 
H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 17 
(1983) (“On remand, the Court of Appeals correctly 
recognized that the four dissenting Justices and Justice 
Blackmun formed a majority to require application of the 
Colorado River test.”). 
 
Thus, we are to examine the dissenting Justices’ views 
to see if there is common ground.  Here, there is more than 
just common ground.  While our sister Courts of Appeals 
have struggled to divine the proper approach, we conclude 
that the struggle is greatly lessened because Justice Stevens, 
along with the other three Justices who joined his opinion, 
have actually told us what jurisdictional test is to be applied. 
 
As we noted above, Justice Stevens specifically states: 
 
I would affirm the judgments in both cases, and 
respectfully dissent from the decision of five 
Members of this Court to vacate and remand.  I 
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close, however, by noting an unusual feature of 
the Court’s judgments in these cases.  It has 
been our practice in a case coming to us from a 
lower federal court to enter a judgment 
commanding that court to conduct any further 
proceedings pursuant to a specific mandate.  
That prior practice has, on occasion, made it 
necessary for Justices to join a judgment that 
did not conform to their own views.  In these 
cases, however, while both the plurality and 
Justice Kennedy agree that there must be a 
remand for further proceedings, their respective 
opinions define different tests to be applied on 
remand.  Given that all four Justices who have 
joined this opinion would uphold the Corps’ 
jurisdiction in both of these cases—and in all 
other cases in which either the plurality’s or 
Justice Kennedy’s test is satisfied—on remand 
each of the judgments should be reinstated if 
either of those tests is met. 
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes 
omitted).  And, lest there be any confusion, he adds, “in these 
and future cases the United States may elect to prove 
jurisdiction under either test.”  Id. at 810 n.14.  Recognizing 
that the plurality and Justice Kennedy had failed to give a 
mandate to the Court of Appeals on remand, Justice Stevens 
and the dissenters provided the mandate.  Were we to 
disregard this key aspect of his opinion we would be ignoring 
the directive of the dissenters.  They have spoken and said 
that, while they would have chosen a broader test, they 
nonetheless agree that jurisdiction exists if either the 
plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test is met. 
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Accordingly, Donovan’s invocation of our decision in 
Rappa is unavailing.  In Rappa, we confronted a Supreme 
Court case in which the three opinions “share[d] no common 
denominator” and each failed to garner a majority of the 
Justices’ votes.  Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1060 (analyzing 
Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981)).  Faced 
with precedent in which there was no majority and no point of 
agreement whatsoever among the disparate opinions, we 
determined that the Supreme Court failed to establish a 
governing standard, and we therefore looked to prior case law 
to determine the relevant rule of law.  Id.  That is not the case 
here.  Instead, in Rapanos there is a point of agreement and 
no basis for disregarding the Supreme Court’s directive that 
two new tests should apply.8
                                              
8 Because the four Rapanos dissenters explicitly endorsed 
both the plurality’s and Justice Kennedy’s jurisdictional tests, 
we are not faced with a concern, like in Rappa, that 
combining the votes of Justices who joined in different 
opinions would lead to unprincipled outcomes.  Rappa noted 
that it would be possible to predict the outcome in any 
theoretical case involving a statute that discriminated among 
types of non-commercial speech and/or banned an entire 
means of communication.  Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1060 n.24.  That 
is, knowing that four Justices in Metromedia thought statutes 
discriminating among types of non-commercial speech are 
unconstitutional and that two Justices believed total bans on a 
particular medium are unconstitutional, one could surmise 
that a statute attempting to do both would be found 
unconstitutional by a majority of the Metromedia Justices, but 
that a statute purporting to do just one would survive a 
challenge.  Such a system, the Rappa court noted, would 
  Because each of the tests for 
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Corps jurisdiction laid out in Rapanos received the explicit 
endorsement of a majority of the Justices, Rapanos creates a 
governing standard for us to apply: the CWA is applicable to 
wetlands that meet either the test laid out by the plurality or 
by Justice Kennedy in Rapanos.    
 
In any given case, this disjunctive standard will yield a 
result with which a majority of the Rapanos Justices would 
agree.  See Casey, 947 F.2d at 693.  If the wetlands have a 
continuous surface connection with “waters of the United 
States,” the plurality and dissenting Justices would combine 
to uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction over the land, whether or not 
the wetlands have a “substantial nexus” (as Justice Kennedy 
defined the term) with the covered waters.  If the wetlands 
(either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands 
in the region) significantly affect the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of “waters of the United States,” then 
Justice Kennedy would join the four dissenting Justices from 
Rapanos to conclude that the wetlands are covered by the 
CWA, regardless of whether the wetlands have a continuous 
                                                                                                     
create the unprincipled outcome that “discriminat[ion] among 
types of non-commercial speech would be constitutional in 
and of itself, [but] would somehow be magically transformed 
into an unconstitutional statute if it also completely banned a 
means of communication.”  Id.  Rapanos creates no such 
dilemma.  We need not “combine” the votes of Justices 
relying on different rationales to find that a majority of the 
Rapanos Justices would come out a particular way in a given 
case.  Two separate rationales each independently enjoy the 
support of five or more Rapanos Justices, without any need to 
“count[] the votes” of Justices relying on different rationales.  
See id. 
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surface connection with “waters of the United States.”  
Finally, if neither of the tests is met, the plurality and Justice 
Kennedy would form a majority saying that the wetlands are 
not covered by the CWA. 
 
In sum, we find that Rapanos establishes two 
governing standards and Donovan’s reliance on pre-Rapanos 
case law is misplaced.  We hold that federal jurisdiction to 
regulate wetlands under the CWA exists if the wetlands meet 
either the plurality’s test or Justice Kennedy’s test from 
Rapanos. 
 
B.  Application of the Rapanos tests to the Government’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
 
 As we have now concluded that either standard in 
Rapanos can be utilized to establish the Corps’ jurisdiction 
over wetlands, we must now determine whether the evidence 
before the District Court was sufficient for it to have granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Government under either 
test. 
 
 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant 
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  The initial burden is on the party 
seeking summary judgment to point to the evidence “which it 
believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact.”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 
(1986).  If the moving party carries this initial burden, “the 
nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” and do more 
than “simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as 
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to the material facts.”  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  A party moving for summary judgment on 
an issue for which it bears the ultimate burden of proof faces 
a more difficult road in seeking summary judgment.  As we 
have said, “it is inappropriate to grant summary judgment in 
favor of a moving party who bears the burden of proof at trial 
unless a reasonable juror would be compelled to find its way 
on the facts needed to rule in its favor on the law.”  El v. Se. 
Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2007) (footnote 
omitted).  In such a case, “if there is a chance that a 
reasonable factfinder would not accept a moving party’s 
necessary propositions of fact,” summary judgment is 
inappropriate.  Id.  All reasonable inferences should be drawn 
against the party moving for summary judgment.  See 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); El, 
479 F.3d at 238. 
 
The government met its initial burden on summary 
judgment of showing that Donovan’s land was subject to the 
Corps’ jurisdiction.  The Government submitted two reports 
prepared by its experts, Edward Launay and scientists from 
the Stroud Research Center.  These reports satisfy the 
Government’s initial burden on summary judgment for both 
Rapanos tests. 
 
First, the reports provide sufficient evidence that 
Donovan’s wetlands meet the plurality’s test to make out a 
prima facie case that the Government is entitled to summary 
judgment on the issue of the Government’s jurisdiction.  See 
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742.  Both reports present facts showing 
that the channels on Donovan’s land—which continue 
through the Sawmill Branch and on to the Smyrna River, both 
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navigable-in-fact waters—meet the plurality’s definition of 
“relatively permanent.”  See id. at 732-33 (plurality opinion).  
In concluding that the streams are perennial in nature, the 
Launay report cites a “degree of soil saturation and surface 
ponding in wetlands during the summer months, 
morphological conditions of the vegetation such as 
buttressing of tree trunks and formation of hummocks, the 
presence and density of plant species adapted to saturated soil 
conditions, and the presence of bed, bank, ordinary 
watermark and flowing water in the tributary channels.”  JA 
510.  The Launay report also discusses downstream 
characteristics, including multiple large culverts, that reflect a 
perennial flow from the channels on Donovan’s land.  The 
Stroud report also concludes that the channels on Donovan’s 
land are permanent based on the existence of several 
organisms in the wetlands and channels, as well as the 
presence of certain species of fish on the property.   
 
Both reports also establish the second requirement of 
the plurality’s test: that the wetlands have a “continuous 
surface connection” to a covered body of water.  The Launay 
report tracks a continuous surface connection from 
Donovan’s wetlands to the Smyrna River and documents the 
findings with fifty-eight photographs carrying explanatory 
captions.  The Stroud report takes a different approach, 
utilizing a tracing chemical that shows a continuous surface 
connection.  The test results show that chemical levels 2700 
meters downstream were non-existent prior to the test, spiked, 
and dropped off precipitously thereafter, reflecting a water 
flow downstream from Donovan’s property.  Therefore, the 
Launay and Stroud reports satisfy the Government’s initial 
burden on summary judgment with respect to the plurality’s 
test. 
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As for Justice Kennedy’s test for CWA coverage, the 
reports also satisfy the Government’s initial Rule 56 burden 
of showing that there is no genuine dispute that Donovan’s 
wetlands, “alone or in combination with similarly situated 
lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily 
understood as ‘navigable.’”  547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).  The Stroud researchers added dissolved bromide 
and dye to the wetland complex intersecting Donovan’s 
property and measured levels downstream, which indicate 
that the Donovan wetlands contribute flow to the Sawmill 
Branch.  The Stroud report also finds that the headwater 
wetlands of the Sawmill Branch, which include Donovan’s 
wetlands, help to remove nitrogen and protect the Delaware 
Estuary from excessive nutrient loading.  The Stroud 
scientists conducted studies demonstrating that Donovan’s 
wetlands help sequester pollutants such as zinc and polycyclic 
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) from downstream waters.  
The Government’s experts also conclude that the wetland 
complex that includes Donovan’s land plays an important role 
in the “aquatic food web,” by providing habitats and nutrients 
for fish species, as well as macroinvertebrates that support 
aquatic life in traditional navigable waters, and by supplying 
energy and nutrients to aquatic life in downstream navigable 
waters.  The Launay report indicates that the gradient of the 
tributary stream channels on Donovan’s land is low, meaning 
that the wetlands retain water for relatively long periods of 
time and perform important functions, such as reducing 
sediment loads and pollutants from storm water, as well as 
retaining and transforming nutrients for downstream 
navigable waters.  Furthermore, the Launay report notes that 
the wetlands on and adjacent to Donovan’s property 
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discharge ground water, thereby maintaining stream flow and 
preserving fish and wildlife habitats. 
 
However, our analysis does not end here.  Having 
determined that the Government met its initial burden under 
Rule 56, we must next analyze whether Donovan came 
forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial.  Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87 (1986).9
 
   
The only evidence Donovan offers in opposition to the 
Government’s motion for summary judgment is his four-page 
declaration.  In that declaration, Donovan states that “the 
amount of water flowing on my Property in a given period is 
completely dependent on the amount of rainfall in the area 
during that period” and “[t]he only source of water flow on 
my Property is rainwater run-off from the adjacent highway.”  
JA 639.  Furthermore, he claims that “in periods of no rain” 
the channels on his property are “completely dry.”  JA 640.  
Donovan also says that “2009 and 2010 are the rainiest and 
wettest years that I can recall in the nearly 50 years I have 
lived in the Smyrna region” and that the channels on his 
                                              
9 Donovan argues that the Magistrate Judge and the District 
Court misapplied the summary judgment standard by placing 
the burden of proof on him to show that his land is not subject 
to the CWA.  While some language from the R&R and the 
District Court’s opinion, read in isolation, might suggest such 
a misapplication of Rule 56, we believe that the Magistrate 
Judge and District Court appropriately analyzed the second 
step of the summary judgment burden-shifting framework in 
finding that Donovan had offered no evidence rebutting the 
Government’s prima facie showing that it was entitled to 
summary judgment. 
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property were “completely dry for significant periods” in 
2008, including “the summer months.”  Id.  Donovan’s 
declaration also asserts that “[i]n periods of heavy rainfall, 
when there is water flowing on my Property, the rainwater 
channels are clearly defined and easy to differentiate from the 
neighboring land.”  JA 641.  These statements all appear to be 
efforts to counter the Government’s evidence that Donovan’s 
wetlands fall within the Rapanos plurality’s test.  We need 
not, however, analyze whether Donovan has come forward 
with facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue about whether the 
Rapanos plurality’s test is satisfied because he 
unquestionably has failed to raise a genuine issue about 
whether Justice Kennedy’s test has been met. 
 
Nothing in Donovan’s affidavit speaks to the effect his 
wetlands have on the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of downstream waters.  Donovan’s only attempt to 
rebut the Government’s showing in this regard is his 
argument that the Government’s evidence is flawed, and that 
therefore a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the 
Government failed to establish its regulatory jurisdiction over 
Donovan’s land.  Specifically, Donovan argues that the 
Government’s experts exaggerate the purported effects that 
Donovan’s wetlands have on navigable-in-fact waters by 
lumping Donovan’s land with 761 acres of other wetlands in 
the Sawmill Branch watershed.  He also attacks other portions 
of the Government’s evidence, calling it uncertain and 
speculative, and claiming that it could fail to convince a 
reasonable fact-finder that the Corps has jurisdiction over 
Donovan’s wetlands.  However, even after drawing all 
reasonable inferences in Donovan’s favor, we find that he has 
not shown a genuine issue for trial. 
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The unrebutted evidence in the record shows that 
Donovan’s wetlands contribute water flow to the Sawmill 
Branch—which becomes tidal approximately 2.5 miles from 
Donovan’s property—and help sequester pollutants such as 
zinc and PAHs from downstream waters.  Specifically, the 
record evidence indicates that the intact wetland flow path on 
Donovan’s property removes approximately 540 grams of 
zinc and 12 grams of PAH compounds over its 72-meter 
length, while a non-wetland flow path on the south of 
Donovan’s property removes approximately 49 grams of zinc 
and 0.8 grams of PAHs over its 65-meter length.  Absent 
Donovan’s wetlands, these pollutants would travel 
downstream, raising contaminant levels for up to 150,000,000 
gallons of water past EPA drinking water guidelines for 
decades or centuries to come.  The record also shows that the 
Donovan wetlands are important sources of energy and 
carbon for downstream habitats.  In addition, the Stroud 
scientists found fish on Donovan’s property that were also 
found in downstream waters of Sawmill Branch Creek.  
Therefore, the record evidence shows that Donovan’s 
wetlands alone significantly affect the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of “waters of the United States,” without 
even considering the effect these wetlands have on such 
waters when aggregated with similarly situated lands in the 
region.10
                                              
10 We do not purport to set out an exhaustive or exclusive list 
of considerations that support a finding of jurisdiction under 
Justice Kennedy’s test.  Nor do we address the question of 
what is meant by the words “or in combination with similarly 
situated lands” in Justice Kennedy’s opinion.  See Rapanos, 
547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  We simply note 
that, standing alone, the evidence that Donovan’s wetlands 
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Donovan points us to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (1944), 
and argues that summary judgment is inappropriate here 
because a reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve the 
opinions and conclusions of the Government’s experts.  
Sartor is not controlling here because the factual evidence 
offered by the Government, and outlined above, is enough to 
meet its burden of production for a Rule 56 motion.  Donovan 
offered no evidence to counter the Government’s factual 
showing that Donovan’s property significantly affects the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of navigable 
waters, nor did he raise sufficient doubt about the credibility 
of the Government’s evidence to defeat summary judgment.  
See Pelphrey v. United States, 674 F.2d 243, 247 (4th Cir. 
1982) (affirming summary judgment for government and 
distinguishing Sartor as dealing with “opinion evidence” 
when the moving party had submitted factual affidavits).   
 
Faced with a motion for summary judgment citing 
record evidence supporting the Corps’ jurisdiction, Donovan 
cannot rely simply on the mere possibility that a jury would 
find the Government’s evidence insufficient.  See Matsushita, 
475 U.S. at 586; cf. El, 479 F.3d at 247 (affirming summary 
judgment for defendant on affirmative defense where nothing 
in the record rebutted defendant’s expert evidence).  There is 
no genuine issue as to the Corps’ jurisdiction in this case and 
                                                                                                     
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of other waters more readily understood as 
“navigable” satisfied the Government’s burden on summary 
judgment and that Donovan has done nothing to rebut that 
showing so as to create a genuine issue for trial.  
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we will therefore affirm the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment to the Government. 
 
C.  Donovan’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
 
 Finally, Donovan challenges the District Court’s denial 
of his motion for judgment on the pleadings.  He alleges that 
the sole basis for the Corps’ purported regulatory jurisdiction 
in this case is the claim that Donovan’s wetlands are adjacent 
to a tributary of a navigable water.  This allegation is derived 
from 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(5), which states that any 
“tributary” of a water covered by the CWA is itself covered 
by the CWA, and 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7), which states that 
any “wetlands adjacent to [covered] waters” are themselves 
covered by the CWA.  According to Donovan, this was the 
purported basis for the Corps’ jurisdiction that the Supreme 
Court rejected in Rapanos and therefore a claim of 
jurisdiction invoking this standard fails on the pleadings.   
 
The District Court correctly denied Donovan’s motion.  
Donovan contends that the Corps has jurisdiction only over 
wetlands that are adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters and that 
the Government’s pleadings fail for not alleging that 
Donovan’s wetlands are adjacent to such waters.  This 
argument is premised on a notion that we rejected above: that 
Rapanos fails to create a governing standard and that, 
therefore, pre-Rapanos law applies.  The Government’s 
complaint need not have pled that Donovan’s wetlands are 
adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters and hence the District 
Court properly denied Donovan’s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. 
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III.  Conclusion 
 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment in favor of the Government and its 
denial of Donovan’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.  
